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1. Introduction
an economic exchange requires agreement by multiple independent parties, the
for an individual to strategically delay agreement in an attempt to capture a
exists
potential
of
share
the total surplus created by the exchange. This "holdout problem," as it has
greater
When

been called, is a common feature of the land-assembly literature (Coase 1960; Eckart 1985;
O'Flaherty 1994; Strange 1995; Menezes and Pitchford 2004a, b; Miceli and Segerson 2007;
Miceli and Sirmans 2007; Nosal 2007) because land development and urban renewal frequently
require the assembly ofmultiple parcels of land. Similarly, the production of new products may
require the use ofmultiple intermediate patented goods. Strategic delay and holdout have also

been studied in other contexts, including debt restructuring that requires acceptance of an
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exchange offer bymultiple creditors (Brown 1989;Datta and Iskandar-Datta 1995;Hege 2003;
Miller and Thomas 2006) and wage negotiations (Cramton and Tracy 1992; Gu and Kuhn
1998; van Ours 1999; Houba and Bolt 2000). In each case, itmay be difficult or impossible to
distinguish strategic holdout behavior from more genuine disagreement arising because
offer

buyer's

is below

a

seller's

reservation

a

price.

Because

of the potentially large inefficiencies arising from failed exchanges in land
the
holdout
assembly,
problem has been cited as one justification for eminent domain, the legal
to
state
of
the
power
expropriate private property without the owner's consent.1 Eminent
domain has traditionally been used in theUnited States to acquire land for public projects but
has been increasingly used to facilitate,with considerable controversy, the transferof property
from

one

private

owner

to another.2

In most

cases,

eminent

domain

is accompanied

by

a

requirement that just compensation be paid, generally interpreted to be fairmarket value.3
From an economic perspective, whether the application of eminent domain can be viewed
as efficientdepends on the relative values attached to the parcels by the parties involved in the
exchange and the costs associated with delay. Difficulties associated with estimating these
parameters using field data complicate the identification and measurement of holdout
behavior, and for this reason previous research on the land-assembly problem has been

primarily theoretical.4 This article uses experimental methods to examine holdout behavior in
laboratory bargaining games that involvemulti-person groups, complementary exchanges, and
there is a large literature on laboratory bargaining behavior, the
vast majority of these studies examine behavior in two-person games involving a single "buyer"
holdout externalities.While

(or proposer) and a single "seller" (or responder). While one party may "holdout" inmulti
and Palfrey 1995; Gneezy,
period bargaining environments (see, for example, McKelvey
a
in
of
and
Roth
2003)
Haruvy,
hopes
receiving
larger payoff, there are no co-dependent

transactions. Thus, while there may be costly delay in simple two-person bargaining
environments, no holdout externalities of the kind commonly associated with land-assembly
type problems are present. Some experimental analyses of Coasian bargaining (for example,
Hoffman and Spitzer 1986; Harrison
interdependence

of

transactions

et al. 1987) include larger groups but lack the critical

necessary

for holdout

externalities.

This

research,

therefore,

provides an important linkbetween the theoretical analysis of holdout developed extensively in
the land-assembly literature and the experimental analysis of behavior in bargaining games.

We distinguish the holdout problem from a related "hold-up" problem (Williamson 1975;
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; Ellingsen and Johannesson 2004; Dawid and MacLeod
2008), which refers to the case when an upstream agent must make a costly investment in the

firststage of a game that is only of use to a single downstream agent in the second stage. In such
cases, a first-period investment can be held up in a second period by the downstream agent in
an attempt to extract a greater share of the total surplus generated by the investment.The ex

post commitment problem inherent in the hold-up problem can lead to inefficiently low
investment in the first stage of the game.
If a land assembler must purchase a set of required parcels sequentially, then initial
purchases may represent an investment that is not easily reversible, or reversible only at a
1
Eminent domain

is also called "compulsory purchase," "compulsory acquisition," or "expropriation."
v. City of New London (2005) for a recent example.
3
See Munch
(2001, 2007)
(1995); and Nosal
(1975); Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984); Hermalin
eminent domain and compensation.
4
The one exception isTanaka
(2007).
2

See Kelo
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considerable loss to the assembler. In such cases, both a hold-up and a holdout problem exist in
the bargaining game as landowners who have not yet sold may ex post exploit the assembler's
previous

investment.

However,

if the assembler

can write

such

contracts,

contingent

that no

purchases occur unless agreement is reached with all landowners, then only a holdout problem
exists.We model only the latter situation.
examine the holdout problem with six experimental treatmentsthat vary the bargaining
institution, the number of bargaining periods, and the cost associated with delay. Our results
We

demonstrate

that holdout

is common

across

institutions

and

strategy for responders, despite theoretical predictions.
demands-to-sell

increase

in multi-period

bargaining

is, on

average,

a payoff-improving

Initial offers-to-buy decrease

treatments

relative

to

a

and

single-period

treatment.Responders are also more likely to reject a given offer inmulti-period treatments.
Imposing delay costs causes offers-to-buy to rise, demands-to-sell to fall, a higher probability of

responders to accept a given offer or demand, and less overall holdout. Importantly, nearly all
exchanges eventually occur in our multi-period treatments, leading to higher overall efficiency
relative to the single-period treatments,both with and without delay costs.
However, caution should be exercised when considering the implications of our results for
the eminent domain question. Our treatmentshave a very small number of sellers and complete

and perfect information, characteristics that are unlikely to be present in the field. Therefore,
the current study should be viewed as an initial empirical investigation of holdout behavior and

costs, leaving many important questions unanswered. The potential for eminent domain to
improve social welfare in the field depends upon the costs of delay relative to the costs of
potentially inefficient land transfers and the disincentive effects of weakened property rights
when eminent domain is used; the prospect of eminent domain may also increase bargaining
delay ifbuyers expect to pay less under eminent domain transfercompared to the free-market
transfer of property. For example, Munch (1975) demonstrates that the prospect of eminent
domain tends to reduce some property values, leading to eminent domain prices below market
value. These issues can only be resolved through further study.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the basic
thatmotivates the experimental design. Section 3 presents the experimental treatments
and provides equilibrium predictions. Experimental results are given in section 4, followed by

model

concluding

2. Modeling

remarks

in section

5.

Framework

Following Menezes and Pitchford (2004b) and Miceli and Segerson (2007), consider a simple
model inwhich a single risk-neutralagent (the buyer) wishes to purchase N complementary units
of a good fromAnother independent risk-neutralagents (the sellers).The units can be interpreted
as intermediate inputs into theproduction of a large project. Each seller /has one unit for sale and
incurs a cost c,-for this unit. The value of the project to the buyer is V ifN input units can be
acquired but is zero otherwise. Let the buyer's valuation and the sellers' costs be such that

f><K,
/= 1

(1)

indicating that there is an economic surplus generated by the project.
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input units can be acquired, the payoff to the buyer is

F_X>)'

(2)

where pf is the price paid for unit /,and each seller /receives a payoff (pt
ct).Assume the
buyermay write contingent contracts such that no sales occur (and, therefore,all parties receive
a payoff of zero) if any of the required input units are not purchased.
We suppose that bargaining takes place between the buyer and the sellers over several
< 5<
1) for each
periods. Delay is costly, such that payoffs are reduced by a factor 5 (where 0
additional period, on average, needed for agreements to be reached. For example, payoffs

would be reduced by 5 if all agreements were reached in the second period, reduced by 25 if
agreements were reached in the thirdperiod, and so on. This is equivalent to assuming that the
?
economic surplus {V J^=lCi) shrinks by 5 from period to period.
We recognize that our approach to delay costs is one ofmany that could be chosen. Our
intenthere is tomodel a symmetricholdout externality.Therefore, a rejection by a responder of
any offer or demand imposes a cost on other bargaining parties regardless of the choices of
other responders. This is consistent both with the nature of contingent contracts and the real

possibility that bargaining involves transaction costs that are incurred each time an offer or a
demand ismade. An alternative assumption would be tomodel delay costs as a weakest link.
That is, all payoffs are reduced by (t
1)5,where t is the actual round inwhich the last needed
offer is accepted. While qualitatively similar to our design, this design would not impose a

holdout externality by the first responders to accept an offer or a demand. The externality
would be driven entirely by the last responder to accept an offer or a demand. This is an
interesting alternative and would be consistent with the idea of holdout as referring to an
individual bargaining party; whereas, our design models holdout as a strategy that can be
adopted by any or all responders at once.

3. The Experiment
We use one-sided, ultimatum-type bargaining rather thanmore complex multi-party Nash
bargaining5 or bargaining with alternating offers.Nash bargaining does not allow one party to

hold out by explicitly rejecting an offer,which is of primary interest in the current project. It
would also place greater importance on risk preferences and is difficult to implement
experimentally because of the likelihood of off-equilibrium decisions. We also avoid bargaining

with alternating offersbecause it introduces an additional incentive to reject an offer in order to
become

the proposer.

treatments
and

sellers

in which
make

To
buyers

repeated

examine
make

the

importance

repeated

take-it-or-leave-it

of being

the proposer,

take-it-or-leave-it
demands

to sell

offers

we

to buy

in other

compare
in some

treatments.

separate
treatments

Responders

decide only whether to accept or reject an offer or a demand.

5
Under Nash
than or equal
receive zero.

bargaining, all parties submit a demand for their share of the surplus. If the sum of the demands is less
to the surplus, each party is paid its demand. If the sum of the demands exceeds the surplus, all parties
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Treatments

Experimentell

are

treatments

All

with

conducted

one

two

and

buyer

sellers,

using

z-Tree

software

conducted six treatments in a 3 x 2 design. Two treatments are single
period bargaining games and four treatments are (up to) 10-period bargaining games. Two of
the latter treatments have costless delay (that is, ? = 0%) and two treatmentshave costly delay.
In these costly delay treatments, 8 = 10%. That is, all payoffs are reduced by 10% for each
(Fischbacher 2007). We

additional

period,

on average,

to be

for agreements

needed

reached.

For

if one

example,

buyer

ismaking repeated offers to two sellers, all participants' payoffs are reduced by 5% each time a
seller rejects an offer. If both sellers accept in the firstperiod, payoffs are not reduced. If both

accept in the second period, all payoffs are reduced by 10%. If one seller accepts in the first
period and the other in the thirdperiod, payoffs are reduced by 10%, and so on. Thus, holding
out generates a payoff-reducing externality regardless of the decisions of the other subjects.
The six total treatments are generated by conducting the (i) single-period, (ii)multi-period
with costless delay, and (iii)multi-period with costly delay protocol (our Baseline protocol), with
buyers making offers in the first three treatmentsand sellersmaking demands in the other three
treatments. In each case, theparty receiving theofferor demand chooses to accept or reject. If any
party rejects an offeror a demand in the single-period treatments (or fails to accept an offer or a
demand by period 10 in themulti-period treatments), then all bargaining parties in that group
receive a payoff of zero. For themulti-period treatments, if a responder rejects an offer or a

demand, theproposer is able tomake a new offeror demand for up to a maximum of 10periods.
Unlike in theGneezy, Haruvy, and Roth (2003) experiments,proposers in our experiment are not
constrained to increase theiroffers (or reduce theirdemands) upon a rejection.
Valuations and costs are common knowledge. The buyer's valuation is V = $90. The
sellers' costs are symmetric such that c\ = c2 = $30. This results in an economic surplus of $30
thatmay be divided among the three participants. All offers/demands (within a period) are
made

Once

simultaneously.

a seller

accepts

an offer

from

the buyer,

or has

a demand

accepted

by the buyer, that seller makes no additional decisions. Sellers do not observe offers or
demands made for other sellers' units but are informed of the amount of any accepted offer or
demand. Subjects are informed of their experimental earnings (adjusted for any delay costs)
plus a $10 show-up fee and are paid privately, in cash, at the end of the experiment.

Predictions

Equilibrium

Assuming complete information and that each agent seeks tomaximize his monetary self
interest, the well-known unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to the single-period
ultimatum game is for the proposer to offer the smallest share of the surplus possible and for

the responder to accept it. Let bt represent a buyer's offer to buy, and dt represent a seller's
demand to sell a particular unit. In themulti-seller design used here, this implies the following:
Proposition
That
6

is, bi

=

1.When

the buyer

makes

ultimatum

offers,

she

offers

each

seller

her

cost.

cf V/.6

Technically, each seller is indifferentbetween accepting or rejecting. Therefore, accepting is a weakly dominant strategy
and, therefore, constitutes a best response. One could alternatively assume that /?,= c, + 8, where e is the smallest unit
of account available (one cent in our experiment). In this case, each seller earns a small surplus by accepting. For
simplicity, we assume that e -> 0 in the limit and proceed without themore cumbersome notation.

This content downloaded from 138.234.154.120 on Fri, 15 Aug 2014 12:45:11 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

449

Experimental Study ofHoldout
Proposition 2.When

sellersmake ultimatum demands, multiple equilibria exist.The set of
V and dt > ct V7.

equilibria are characterized by H1^ldj=
Proposition
with

a non-negative

3. Responders

should accept any offer or set of demands that leaves them

surplus.

Proposition 1 is the standard equilibrium prediction for proposer behavior, which implies
here that the buyer captures all (or nearly all) of the surplus. Proposition 2 characterizes a
Nash-like bargaining outcome from the perspective of sellers. Proposition 3 follows from the
assumption that a positive payoff is preferred to a zero payoff.
Propositions 1 through 3 are unaffected by the addition of multiple bargaining periods,
with or without costly delay. Responders cannot increase their payoff by rejecting an offer or
a set of demands

that leaves them with a non-negative surplus because there is nothing in
the standard game-theoretic predictions of proposers' behavior to indicate that they,
in equilibrium, should offer a greater share of the surplus following a rejected offer or

demand.

The wealth of research in single-period, ultimatum-type bargaining games has consistently
demonstrated that behavior does not conform to the standard predictions based on the simple
assumption

of maximizing

one's

self-interest.

monetary

this

However,

research

little

provides

guidance on what we should expect in a multi-period bargaining game of the type presented
here. In themulti-period treatments, responders may hold out in the hope of obtaining a larger
share of the surplus. This possibility raises some interesting behavioral questions: Do either
initial or subsequent offers or demands in a multiple-period game differ from those in a single
period game? Are responders more likely to reject a given offer or demand in a multi-period
game compared to the single-period game? How do proposers in a multi-period game respond
to a rejection? Is holding out a payoff-improving strategy,on average? How is the duration of
holdout affected by the cost of delay? Do the rate of disagreement (that is, failed exchanges)

and the efficiency of exchange differ in themulti-period game compared to the single-period
game?

Table

1. Offer/Demand

and Earnings

Results

by Treatment

(Standard Deviations

in

Parentheses)
Mean
Proposer
Buyer
Buyer
Buyer

Seller
Seller
Seller

Treatment

Single period
10-period

costless delay
10-period costly
delay
Single period
10-period
costless delay
10-period costly
delay

Mean

Buyer
First-Period

Mean Seller
First-Period

Mean Real
Final Buyer

Mean Real
Final Seller

Earnings

Earnings

Earnings

Earnings

Number
of Groups

$36.62

$16.76

$6.62

$8.62

$4.48

N = 29

(3.45)
$34.28

(6.66)
$21.43

N = 29

(6.26)
$18.37

(8.60)
$10.55
(5.25)
$11.12

(4.45)
$9.72

(3.31)
$35.82

(3.45)
$4.28
(3.31)
$5.82

(3.00)
$7.24

N = 30

(2.57)
$41.66

(5.08)
$6.68

(2.57)
$11.66

(5.67)
$6.94

(2.78)
$8.07

N = 26

(6.94)

(4.71)
$16.73

(6.05)
$10.43

(5.67)
$9.28

TV= 30

(11.06)
$1.65

(7.61)
$14.17

(5.02)
$9.39

(3.38)
$7.80

N = 30

(8.94)

(6.86)

(4.90)

(2.96)

First-Period
Offer/Demand

(4.71)
$46.73
(7.62)
$44.17
(6.86)

-$3.46
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2. Probit Regression Results forResponders' Decisions
probability of acceptance are reported)

Table

(marginal effects,dFIdx, for the

Buyer-Offer Treatments

Offer/Demand
SinglePeriod
CostlessDelay
TV
PseudoR2
Prob > x2

Seller-Demand

0.055***
0.370***
-0.381**

Treatments

-0.063***
0.580***
-0.244***
176
172
0.583
0.000

0.388
0.000

**
Significant at the 5% level.
***
Significant at the 1% level.

4. Results
Subjects for all treatmentswere undergraduate volunteers at Gettysburg College. Subjects
participated anonymously via computer. Five hundred and twenty-two student subjects
participated in 30 sessions for a total of about 30 bargaining groups per treatment.
1 presents offer, demand, and earnings results from the six treatments. The table
gives themean first-period offeror demand, as well as themean real final payoff for buyers and
sellers. Real payoffs are adjusted for any delay costs. For comparison, the table also gives the
Table

mean buyer and seller earnings thatwould have resulted had all first-period offers or demands
been

accepted.

Table 2 reports themarginal effects from a probit regression analysis of responders' first
=
= 0.We
1, reject
analyze
period decisions. The response variable is defined such that accept
the buyer-offerand seller-demand protocols separately, controlling in each case for the offer or

demand and including two dummy variables indicating that the treatmentwas single period or
had costless delay. The default {Baseline) is themulti-period costly delay treatment.
Table 3 provides rejection, holdout, and efficiency statistics.Holdout is calculated as the

mean number of rejected offers or demands per group. Efficiency is calculated as the actual
total group earnings divided by themaximum possible ($30 per group, the value of the original
surplus).

A large number of comparisons can be made based on the results inTables
keep

these

Table

comparisons

3. Holdout

most

clear,

we

discuss

Buyer
Buyer
Buyer
Seller
Seller
Seller

in a

separate

subsection

1, 2, and 3. To

below.

and Efficiency Results
Percentage of
First-Period

Proposer

each

Treatment

Single period
10-period costless delay
10-period costly delay
Single period
10-period costless delay
10-period costly delay

Rejections

25.9%
96.6%
66.7%
15.4%
91.7%
71.7%

Mean

Holdout

(Total Rejections
per Group)

Number
of Failed
Agreements

NA
58.6%12
TV = 29
10.8 100%
0
TV
0 85.3%
2.9
TV = 26
NA
676.9%
= 30
1 96.7% TV
11.0
=
0 N3.330
83.3%

Number
Efficiency

of

Groups

TV

= 29

=

30
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Predictions

Behavior is qualitatively, but not strictly,consistent with the game-theoretic predictions,
which is consistent with general findings from themany ultimatum bargaining experiments that
have been conducted to date. That is,using an equal split of the surplus as a natural focal point
(offers/demands of 40), first-period offers and earnings favored the buyer in all of the buyer
offer treatmentsbut favored the sellers in all of the seller-demand treatments.These differences
are statistically significant (in the hypothesized direction) in every case.7

First-Round

across Treatments

Offers and Demands

important result of this study concerns the impacts thatmulti-period bargaining and
costly delay have on initial offers or demands, as this likelydetermines, inpart, the decisions of
responders as well as the path of subsequent offers or demands. On average, first-period offers
An

from the buyer-offerwith costless delay treatmentwere $2.34 lower than in the single-period
buyer-offer treatment, and the difference is statistically significant.8 Similarly, first-period
demands

on

were,

average,

$5.09

higher

than

in the single-period

seller-demand

treatment.9

Additionally, imposing costly delay caused average initial offers to rise by $1.54 and initial
demands to fall by $2.56, relative to the costless delay treatments, and the differences are
statistically significant.10

Responders'

First-Period

Decisions

Similarly, it is important to understand how the number of bargaining periods and the cost
of delay impact a responder's bargaining stance as well. Table 2 shows that, as expected, the
size of the actual offer or demand is an important determinant of the probability of accepting
an offer. The probability of a seller accepting a buyer's first-round offer increased by around
5.5% for each $1.00 increase in the offer,while the probability of a buyer accepting a seller's
demand decreased by 6.3% for each $1.00 increase in the demand. However, buyers and sellers
alike were much more likely to accept a given offer or demand if there was only a single

bargaining period?buyers were 58% more likely and sellerswere 37% more likely to accept in
this case. However, both parties took a tougher bargaining stance when delay was costless.
Buyers were 24% less likely to accept a given demand, and sellerswere 38% less likely to accept
a given offer under costless delay.
Figures 1 and 2 show the cumulative probability (resulting from the probit model) of a
responder accepting a given first-period offer or demand over the entire range of offers and

demands.

The figures further support the result that responders took a much tougher bargaining
stance when delay was costless versus costly, but were much more willing to accept a given offer
or demand

7

in the single-period

treatments

relative

to the multi-period

treatments.

signed ranks test, all one-tailed significance levels <0.015.
= 0.000. All statistical
test, two-tailed significance level
comparisons across
Using Mann-Whitney
tests. All within-treatment comparisons follow a Wilcoxon
signed ranks test.
Mann-Whitney
9
Two-tailed significance level = 0.000.
10
Two-tailed significance levels = 0.002 and 0.030, respectively.
8

Using Wilcoxon
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In the single-period treatments,buyers' final earnings exceeded sellers' final earnings in the
buyer-offer treatment,11but although sellers earned more, on average, in the seller-demand
treatment, the difference was not statistically significant. Interestingly, however, real final
payoffs favored the buyer in all four of the multi-round treatments. This difference was
statistically significant only in the buyer-offerwith costly delay treatment.12

Final Earnings

versus First-Round

Earnings

within Treatments

treatments, themean real earnings of the responder are higher
than themean first-period offer or demands would have generated, and the differences are
statistically significant in every treatment.13 In other words, mean real offers to the responders
In all fourmulti-period

rose in subsequent periods. This implies that,with or without delay costs, holdout (that is,
rejecting low offers or high demands) is, on average, a payoff-improving strategy for the
responder in each treatment.
This result is particularly strong in the seller-demand treatments. Average first-period
earnings for the buyer would have been very low in both treatments, and even negative in the

seller-demand with costless delay treatment. Sellers face a difficult coordination problem in
these treatments, and in this case made excessively high demands. In fact, over half of the
buyers (18 out of 30) in this treatment effectivelyhad negative offers in the first period as a
result of the sellers' joint demands averaging $46.73 and had no choice but to reject at least one
of the demands. The coordination problem was present, though not as severe, in the seller
11
One-tailed significance level = 0.007.
12
Two-tailed significance level = 0.004.
13
signed ranks test, all two-tailed significance levels <0.022.
Using Wilcoxon
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demand with costly delay treatment,where about a thirdof buyers (9 out of 30) faced negative
payoffs in the firstperiod.
This result is further illustrated in Figures 3a through 4b, which give the change in real
offersby buyers to sellers (Figures 3a, b)14 or by sellers to buyers (Figures 4a, b)15 following a
rejection.

the tendency inFigures 3a and 3b for buyers' real offers to sellers to rise following
a rejection, particularly in the early rounds. The result is even stronger for the seller-demand
Notice

treatments.The change in sellers' joint demands following a rejection by the buyer resulted in a
larger real surplus for the buyer in all but a few instances, even in the presence of costly delay.

Holdout

and Efficiency across Treatments

As first-period offers decreased and first-period demands increased in themulti-period
treatments relative to single-period treatments (and responders were more likely to reject a
given offer or demand), the number of rejections increased dramatically, as illustrated in
was prevalent in all four multi-period treatments. Overall holdout was
considerably higher in treatmentswithout delay costs, with three to four times the number of
rejected offers or demands per group compared to the treatments with delay costs. These

Table 3. Holdout

differences were

statistically significant.16 There was no significant difference in holdout
between the buyer-offer treatments compared to the seller-demand treatments. Nearly all

exchanges eventually occurred in our multi-period treatments, leading to higher overall
efficiencyrelative to the single-period treatments, both with and without delay costs. Only one
group in one treatment (seller-demand with costless delay) failed to reach an agreement during
the 10-period limit.
14
Shown is the real surplus offered by buyers to sellers.
15
Shown is the real buyer's surplus that resulted from the joint demands made by sellers.
16
= 0.000 in each case.
test, two-tailed significance level
Using Mann-Whitney
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(b) Buyer offer,costlydelay treatment
Figure

3. Change

in Real Offers

(to Sellers)

by Period
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5. Conclusion
The theory of holdout developed in the land-assembly literature is difficult to empirically
evaluate due to the lack of reliable field data on buyer and seller valuations and delay costs.
Our research provides an initial systematic empirical study of holdout behavior inmultilateral
bargaining environments by linking the theoretical analysis with the well-developed

experimental literature on bargaining. In contrast to the existing experimental bargaining
literature, our design utilizes multi-person groups with co-dependent transactions and delay
costs that introduce a holdout possibility as well as a holdout externality.
In particular,

we

the behavioral

examine

of proposers

responses

and

to changes

responders

inbargaining institutions, thenumber of bargaining periods, and the costs associated with delay.
The results of a series of six treatmentsdemonstrate that holdout is common across bargaining
institutionsand is a payoff-improving strategyon average, despite the presence of delay costs, in
each of the treatments studied to date. As such, our results indicate that even if the holdout
problem does not exist in theory (assuming payoff-maximizing bargainers), itmay still exist in
practice. The number of bargaining periods also had a significant effect on subject behavior.
Initial

offers-to-buy

decrease

and

demands-to-sell

increase

inmulti-period

treatments

bargaining

relative to a single-period treatment.Compounding this problem is that responders exhibited a
lower probability of accepting a given offer or demand in the early periods of themulti-period
treatments. Thus, opportunities for additional bargaining may have led both proposers and
responders to take a more aggressive bargaining stance initially,with the recognition that offers
or demands could become more generous in subsequent periods, ifnecessary. Imposing delay
costs causes offers-to-buy to rise, demands-to-sell to fall, a higher probability of responders
accepting a given offer or demand, and less overall holdout. Importantly, nearly all exchanges
eventually occurred in our multi-period treatments, leading to higher overall efficiencyrelative to
the single-period treatments,both with and without delay costs.
It would clearly be premature, however, to discount the potential welfare improvements
that eminent domain might provide based on these findings alone. Substantial land-assembly
type projects in the field likely involve many more parties than in our experiment, as well as
significant information asymmetries, both of which are likely to increase bargaining delay and
associated delay costs. The potential for eminent domain to improve social welfare in the field,

however, depends on whether it actually reduces delay costs relative to voluntary transfer, a
question that has yet to be adequately addressed theoretically, empirically, or experimentally.
While theirmodeling framework is different from ours, Miceli and Segerson (2007) show

theoretically how the threat of eminent domain can result in earlier agreements. Munch (1975),
however, demonstrates empirically that the threat of eminent domain may depress property
values, resulting in intentional delay on the part of the buyer and potentially high court costs
associated with the eminent domain process. It would be interesting to examine how the
background threat of eminent domain affects behavior in an experimental setting such as ours.
Therefore, the current study should be viewed as an initial empirical investigation of
holdout behavior and costs, leavingmany important questions unanswered. We
potentially

important

features

of

real-world

bargaining

environments

are

recognize that

absent,

and

we

propose to broaden the investigation to include environments with larger bargaining groups,
competition

between

sellers,

incomplete

information

about

buyers'

values

and

sellers'

costs,

and

eminent domain threats. Furthermore, exploring the use of alternative bargaining institutions,
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such as alternating offers or Nash bargaining, should be a fruitful avenue
experimental research into behavior inmultilateral bargaining situations.

for future
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